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COMMENT: FEDERALISM AND TWO 
CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTS 
CHRISTOPHER]. PETERSt 
Does the American system of federalism advance or retard the 
protection of individual rights? The question cannot be answered 
satisfactorily without determining, in advance, which rights are 
worth protecting. 
Imagine two different conceptions of individual rights. On the 
first conception, which I will refer to as the public conception, the 
individual rights that matter most are rights against the government: 
rights such as freedom of speech, press, and religion, due process 
and equal protection of the laws, freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and so on. These are the rights codified in the 
American Bill of Rights, broadly construed to include the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution as well as the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth.1 
On the second conception of individual rights, which I will call 
the private conception, the rights that matter most are rights against 
other private individuals (or groups of private individuals, such as 
corporations). Such rights include the rights to be free from bodily 
assault, from theft of property, from forcible labor, and perhaps 
others. With the notable exception of the Thirteenth Amendment,2 
these kinds of rights seem to find no overt expression in the federal 
Constitution. 
I want to suggest in this brief Comment that one's views on the 
tAssistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A., 
1989, Amherst College; J.D., 1992, University of Michigan Law School. I would 
like to thank the following people for their efforts in making this Symposium 
possible: Dean Joan Mahoney; Associate Dean Frederica Lombard; Assistant 
Dean James Robb, Deborah Mcfarland, Kristine Herzog, and the rest of the 
Development Office staff; Coco Siewert; Betty Maltz; the editorial board and 
staff of The Wayne Law Review; fellow members of the faculty Programs & 
Awards Committee; and participants in both Symposium panels. 
1. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIII, XIV, XV. 
2. See U.S. CON ST. amend. XIII. 
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relationship between federalism and individual rights depend to a 
very great extent on which of these conceptions one prefers. The 
different consequences of choosing each conception over the other 
have been nicely demonstrated i?y two of the presentations made 
this afternoon, those of Professor Hamilton and Professor Waits.3 
I will focus on them, although I believe the distinction between the 
two" conceptions also underlies much of what Professor 
Chemerinsky has said in his critique of the Supreme Court's 
federalism jurisprudence. 
Let me begin with the paper presented by Professor Waits. In 
Professor Waits's view, the Supreme Court's decision in United 
States v. Morrison4 retards individual rights by making it more 
difficult for women like Christy Brzonkala to redress acts of 
gender-based violence carried out against them. By means of the 
Violence Against Women Act,S Congress had sought to vindicate 
the rights of women to be free from such violence. In Morrison, 
however, the Court interposed federalism as an obstacle to this 
vindication. Norms of federalism, then-at least as interpreted by 
the Morrison Court - had the effect of hindering rather than 
promoting the protection of rights. (professor Chemerinsky also 
takes this view of Morrison.) 
Note that Professor Waits implicitly adopts the second, private 
conception of rights I described earlier. In assessing the value of 
federalism, her chief concern is for rights individuals have against" 
other private parties, such as the right to be free from gender-based 
violence. By this standard of rights, federalism does not seem to fare 
very well, at least in the Morrison case. Far from facilitating the 
protection of private rights, federalism was applied in Morrison to 
actively frustrate that protection by disabling the institution most 
willing to provide it-the federal government. Federalism, that is, 
became a sword against rights rather than a shield around them. 
Contrast Professor Waits's private conception of rights with 
3. Professor Kathleen Waits made a presentation attbe Symposium, however 
she was unable to submit her article to this Wayne Law Review issue. 
4. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2001). 
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Professor Hamilton's public conception. For Professor Hamilton, 
federalism is a safeguard, or a collection of safeguards, against the 
overextension of government~s power to coerce individuals. 
Professor Hamilton implicitly recognizes that most legislation 
restricts individual freedom by its very nature; even legislation 
designed to protect the rights of some people risks infringing the 
rights of others. The classic example is the criminal law , which risks 
punishing innocent parties to protect the rights of the community. 
In the context of the Violence Against Women Act, a strict civil 
libertarian might worry that providing civil remedies or criminal 
penalties for violence "motivated by" gender goes beyond merely 
assigning consequences to actions and impairs the individual's rights 
to think and to speak, however offensive that thought or speech 
might be to others. The costs to individual rights imposed by such 
a statute might outstrip the benefits provided by it. On this view, 
by placing obstacles in the path of broad national legislation, a 
system of dual sovereignty diminishes both the risk and the cost of 
legislation that produces a net detriment to individual rights. 
Professor Hamilton's unspoken adoption of a public conception 
of individual rights, and Professor Waits's adoption of a private 
conception, produce interesting implications for their respective 
methodologies. Professor Hamilton's defense of federalism is built 
upon a big-picture view of the relationship between the national 
and the state governments; for her, federalism is not so much a 
question of how to allocate power in particular cases, or over 
particular subjects, as it is a question of how to maintain an 
enduring balance of power between the two levels of government. 
As such, Professor Hamilton's methodology is one of institutional 
theory, of predicting the long-term consequences of particular 
decisions on the overall allocation of sovereignty and thus on the 
tension between sovereignty and individual rights. 
Professor Waits's methodology could hardly be more different. 
She takes a narrative or "storytelling" approach, which she readily 
acknowledges is intended to focus our attention on the impact that 
seemingly abstract decisions of doctrine can have on real 
people-on the implications of federalism for particular individuals 
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in panicular cases. Her methodology thus is particularized and 
experiential rather than generalized and theoretical. 
This contrast in methodologies, I think, is closely connected to 
the contrast in substantive conceptions of rights I described a 
moment ago. A public conception of rights is not very well 
supported by a case-specific, experiential methodology, for two 
related reasons. First, there are so many variables affecting 
government's respect for individual rights that it is difficult or 
impossible to tell, in any given case, how particular rights are 
affected by a certain allocation of power between the state and 
federal governments. Second, in cases where individual rights 
clearly have been violated by government, courts find remedies in 
the substantive rights provisions of the Constitution rather than in 
its structural provisions. When the federal government burdens free 
speech, for instance, a court will decide the case pursuant to the 
First Amendment, not the Commerce Clause. Someone looking for 
a connection between federalism and the protection of rights, then, 
must focus rather abstractly on large questions of institutional 
structure rather than on particular cases. 
A private conception of rights, however, lends itself nicely to 
case-specific and even emotive analysis, because it suffers from 
neither of these data collection problems. Usually it is relatively 
simple to isolate a connection between private individual rights and 
legislation designed to protect them. The federal Violence Against 
Women Act, for instance, clearly vindicated the right to be free 
from gender-based violence. And cases involving private rights are 
virtually never decided pursuant to the substantive rights provisions 
of the Constitution, because those provisions, with the rarely 
invoked exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, do not apply to 
private conduct. Thus it normally is not difficult to trace a 
particular effect on private rights to a particular allocation of federal 
and state power. In Morrison, for example, a decision upholding 
Congress' authority to create the Violence Against Women Act 
would have promoted individual rights by preserving the Act's 
protections against gender-based violence, while the Court's actual 
decision to limit Congress' authority impaired individual rights by 
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destroying those protections. 
It therefore appears that those who prefer a private conception 
of rights, as Professor Waits does, can assess the connection 
between rights and federalism by looking to specific instances 
involving specific policies and specific people. Those who prefer a 
public conception of rights, like Professor Hamilton, must be 
content with more abstract arguments of theory. The result is to 
give the proponents of private rights something of a rhetorical 
advantage.6 
In my view, however, neither methodology is sufficient by 
itself; nor is either substantive conception of individual rights 
complete without the other. Let me begin with the substantive 
conceptions. To envision federalism as primarily about protecting 
individual rights from public impairment is, to borrow a metaphor 
from Calvin Massey, to see its yin without appreciating its yang.7 
Federalism is about empowering government, not just about 
limiting it-a point Professor Chemerinsky makes quite effectively 
in his contribution to this Symposium. The Constitution was, after 
all, a fundamental departure from the status quo under the Articles 
of Confederation, in which the national government wielded 
almost no sovereign authority. A reading of federalism as 
principally a source of limitation on national sovereignty ignores 
the transformative impact of that departure; it elides the fact that 
the Constitution greatly enlarged the power of the national 
government. 
To be sure, the Framers, in speaking of individual rights, often 
voiced the concern that individual rights would be trampled by the 
public. Thus Madison in Federalist No. 10 fretted about the danger 
6. Perhaps not, however, in the legal academy, which often appears more 
receptive to bloodless, abstract accounts than with uncomfortable stories about 
real people. 
7. See Caivin Massey, TheTaoojFederalism,20HARV.J.L.&PUB.POL'Y887 
(1997). 
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to "the rights of ... citizens,,8 posed by majority factions,9 and 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 justified an independent judiciary as 
a shield for individual and minority rights.10 But the Framers also 
understood that protection of the individual's rights against other 
private parties was what justified having government in the first 
place. This was the import of Madison's famous dictum in Federalist 
No. 51 that "[i]f men were angels, no government would be 
necessary.,,11 The Framers, after all, had read Hobbes and Locke, 
both of whom saw in government an essential remedy for private 
violence. 12 
The Constitution, then, is aimed both at limiting government 
and at empowering it; it is aimed both at preserving public rights 
and at protecting private ones. The federalism provisions of that 
Constitution, as parts of the Constitution, must be read in this 
spirit. The sovereignty granted the national government by the 
Constitution is not infinitely broad, but it is (nearly) infinitely 
deep; as the Court held in McCulloch v. Maryland,13 Congress has 
the power to employ "all means which are appropriate" to the 
limited ends that are set for it.14 And one of the ends of federal 
power, one of the most important ones, must be the defense-and 
indeed the advancement-of individual rights. This truism arises 
from the very fact of the Constitution itself, which transformed an 
alliance of independent states into a unified nation under the head 
8. THE FEDERAUST No. 10, at 123 a ames Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987). 
9. See id. at 122-28. 
10. See THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 436-42 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 1987). 
11. See THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 319 Games Madison) (Isaac Kramnick 
ed., 1987). . 
12. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 223-28 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Penguin Books 1968) (1651);]OHNLOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT 
305,323,366-69,374-77,395-99,401-09 (peter Lasletted., Cambridge Univ.Press 
1963) (1690). 
13. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
14. [d. at 420 (emphasis added). Violation of specific rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution, of course, would not be an "appropriate" means. 
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of a powerful and potentially energetic central government.15 The 
truism is confirmed by the Reconstruction Amendments, 
particularly by the clause of each amendment that allows Congress 
to enforce its commands "by appropriate legislation. ,,16 To interpret 
federalism norms solely according to a public conception of rights 
is to undervalue or ignore the extent to which the private 
conception is deeply embedded in the fabric of our constitutional 
structure. 
Now to methodology. Which approach is most appropriate to 
assessing the relationship between federalism and individual rights: 
Professor Hamilton's broad structural approach, animated by 
rather abstract theory, or Professor Waits's case-specific approach, 
animated by experience and even emotion? The answer in my view 
is that each approach is best when played against the other. 
On the one hand, assessing federalism on a caSe-by-case basis, 
with the focus solely on the effects of the particular regulation 
being challenged, is penny-wise but pound-foolish. Concern for 
integrity of process must on occasion trump anxiety about 
particular results, even horrible ones. This is because process can 
itself protect individual rights, a fact we implicitly acknowledge 
when, for instance, we require prosecutors to prove guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt and plaintiffs to prove liability by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Federalism belongs to this same 
family of procedural safeguards; and so, as Professor Hamilton 
demonstrates, its very point is lost when we weaken or ignore its 
requirements for the sake of achieving satisfying results in 
particular cases. 
At the same time, we must continually reassess whether the 
15. Cf. THE FEDERAUST No. 26, at 196 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac 
Kramnick eel. 1987), in which Hamilton, defends the proposed grant of power 
to Congress to appropriate money "[t]o raise and support armies," see U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 12, notes the failure of the Articles of Confederation to 
"stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER 
and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of 
private rights." 
16. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2, XIV, § 5, XV, § 2. 
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supposed safeguards of federalism really work as promised. This is 
where Professor Waits's evocative technique of storytelling 
becomes especially valuable: it reminds us that the connection 
between federalism and individual rights cannot be taken for 
granted. The case of Christy Brzonkala suggests that dual 
sovereignty sometimes harms individual rights more than it helps 
them, because it sometimes gets in the way of innovative federal 
legislation designed to protect rights from private encroachment. If 
we begin to see enough examples like this, we might conclude that 
the costs to individual rights imposed by the Court's heightened 
enforcement of federalism outweigh its benefits. Indeed, one could 
make a respectable case that we have seen plenty of examples like 
this already-that since the Civil War, federalism has served far 
more often as an obstacle to the protection of rights than as a 
facilitator of that protection. (professor Chemerinsky's 
contribution here goes a long way toward making precisely this 
case.) 
Perhaps, then, courts should use the drama of particular cases 
like United States v. Morrison17 not as a reason to override the 
safeguards of federalism, but as a reason to question the efficacy, or 
at least the application, of those safeguards. And perhaps that 
process of questioning should proceed on the assumption that 
private rights-those we have with respect to our fellow 
citizens-are as worthy of protection as the rights we have with 
respect to our government. 
17. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
